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MARK HOLUB AND JASON MITCHELL
On-Market Share Buy-Backs: ASX
Disclosure Requirements and Complianceabac_356 31..58
Our paper investigates the compliance of Australian listed firms with the
ASX disclosure rules for on-market share buy-backs. We find that firm
compliance is reasonable for initial buy-back announcements, but poor for
final buy-back notices. In the latter instance, the disclosure in the appro-
priate ASX notice is provided in only 53% of cases. Of significant concern
is the even lower degree of final notice compliance (42%) for buy-backs
tagged as having ‘unlimited’ duration. Across our total sample of 807
buy-backs, an alternative form of disclosure of buy-back completion is
provided in 25% of cases, and no proper notification of either the initial
announcement or the completion of the buy-back is provided in 12% of
cases. In order to improve buy-back transparency, some legislative reform
of theASX rules is suggested including: discontinuing ‘unlimited duration’
buy-backs, restricting buy-back periods to a maximum of twelve months
(after which a new buy-back process must be initiated), avoiding multiple
simultaneous buy-backs, removing the requirement of daily buy-back
notices in favour of more meaningful quarterly or monthly reports, and
requiring greater disclosure in relation to foreign buy-backs.
Key words: ASX announcements; Buy-backs; Compliance; Information
disclosure; Share repurchases.
Buy-back activity has increased tremendously inAustralia over the past decade.The
number of buy-backs, amount of shares and the dollar value of shares bought back
during this period (Table 1) illustrate the importance and magnitude of this restruc-
turing technique.Australian domestic companies on the ASX repurchased some 3.4
billion ordinary shares costing $14.8 billion over the period 2000–09 (see Table 1
Panel A).When one adds in the $7.4 billion paid by foreign companies for ordinary
shares (Panel B) and the $2.8 billion paid for non-ordinary shares across all com-
panies (Panel C), the total amount repurchased is $24.9 billion (Panel D). The
number of on-market buy-backs has mushroomed from 29 in 2000 to a high of 165
during 2008. In total, we are able to identify 807 on-market buy-backs over the
10-year period 2000–09.
Mark Holub (mark.holub@uwa.edu.au) is an Assistant Professor in the Business School at The Univer-
sity of Western Australia, and Jason Mitchell is Financial Officer, CTR—Structured Financial Instru-
ments, at the World Bank.
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The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, or the governments they
represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data used in this work.
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Mitchell and Robinson (1999) originally evaluated the information content of
ASX buy-back announcements up to 1995, concentrating on the motivations
provided by managers. Since then, there have been a number of changes to the
regulatory requirements and the level of buy-back activity has increased substan-
tially. In the Australian setting, the impact of the information content and signalling
of on-market buy-backs is now well documented (Harris and Ramsay, 1995; Chris-
tianto et al., 1997; Balachandran and Faff, 2004; Lamba and Ramsay, 2005). Further-
more, undervaluation is established as one of the major motivations of the buy-back
process, both in studies comparing actual prices to theoretical models of valuation in
the period leading up to the buy-back (Mitchell et al., 2006) and in research exam-
ining the determinants that influence the buy-back process (Mitchell and Dhar-
mawan, 2007). A recent paper by Brailsford et al. (2008) examined the factors that
influence the magnitude of the buy-back amount (i.e., the disclosed and actual
buy-back percentage) and found that undervaluation, capital restructuring and
liquidity consistently explained the intended (announced) percentage, but not the
actual percentage, of shares repurchased. While some of the above studies have
integrated the disclosed motivations into the empirical work, the full extent of what
information is contained in ASX announcements has not been established and
neither has the degree of firms’ compliance with the disclosure rules.
The simplification of the original buy-back legislation in 1995 facilitated the
conduct of share buy-backs and is one of the major reasons suggested for the
subsequent growth in share buy-back activity.1 Changes inASXListingRules—which
have sought to streamline the reporting framework of on-market buy-backs—have
also helped in this regard.However, to date, little is known about the extent to which
firms have complied with existing legislative and reporting requirements, and what
disclosure firms provide as part of their announcements and buy-back activity. The
Australian environment provides an ideal setting for examining the impact of buy-
back disclosure.With over a decade of prescribed disclosure rules, there is now a rich
data set that allows us to comprehensively document firm behaviour.
Studying the information content of buy-back disclosure also has important policy
implications. It allows an assessment of whether the announcement approach is
effective in communicating information about a buy-back and its results. If compli-
ance with disclosure requirements is not being met then theASX, from an oversight
perspective, should be concerned.The degree of compliance also has implications for
empirical studies.If thequalityof information in buy-back announcements is variable,
the buy-back data used in studies may not represent a reliable information set.2
1 Dharmawan and Mitchell (2001) and Lamba and Ramsay (2005) note that legislative changes may
have altered the signalling impact of on-market buy-back activity.
2 Evidence on the quality of disclosure in the Australian environment potentially has spill-over impli-
cations for other markets. These markets are disadvantaged relative to Australia as they do not have
the minimal ASX requirements of providing initial announcement information and then providing
continuous disclosure throughout the buy-back process. The quality of information is likely to be
poorer in the U.S. and U.K.markets where companies only provide information at their discretion and
then only for actual share repurchases rather than any ex ante information signalling as part of an
announcement (Fried, 2001; Cook et al., 2004).
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The focus of our paper is to investigate firms’ compliance with the disclosure of
on-market buy-back information required by theASX.We provide evidence of what
information is, and is not, actually disclosed throughout the buy-back process and
whether the information provided is clear. We also outline some suggestions for
improved buy-back transparency and legislative reform.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKAND REGULATORY CHANGES
A timeline of key regulatory changes in the Corporations Law and ASX Listing
Rules is presented in Figure 1.3 Primarily, three regulatory regimes have existed for
share buy-backs in Australia:
1. Pre-1995: the period prior to the First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995
(FCLSA);
2. 1995–99: the period following FCLSA; and
3. Post-1999: the period since ASX Listing Rule changes became effective on 1
September 1999 (including additional listing rule amendments made on 30 Sep-
tember 2001).
This section outlines the key changes in regulatory requirements during these three
regimes.
Corporations Law
Before 1989, buy-backs were not specifically permitted in Australia. In November
1989, enabling legislation was introduced into the Corporations Law allowing
3 Amore detailed account of the legislative development of share buy-backs and the regulatory changes
that have occurred can be found in Harris and Ramsay (1995), Dharmawan and Mitchell (1999, 2001),
Lamba and Ramsay (2000, 2005), and the CCH Corporations Law Commentary.
Figure 1
TIMELINE OF REGULATORY CHANGES TO SHARE BUY-BACKS
1989 1 November Legislation introduced allowing share buy-backs 
1990 31 December New ASX Listing Rules for on-market buy-backs 
1995 9 December First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995
1996  1 July ASX Listing Rule changes: notices required in standardized format (Appendices 
7B/7C/7D/7E) 
1998 1 July Further amendments to Corporations Law: Part J.2 Division 2 
1999 1 September ASX Listing Rule changes: revised disclosure requirements and new Appendices 
3C/3D/3E/3F (recognition of buy-backs of ‘unlimited’ duration) 
2001 30 September ASX Listing Rule changes: amendments to Appendices 3C/3D/3E/3F (director’s 
participation now deleted) 
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companies to buy back shares under certain conditions.4 Five types of buy-backs
were allowed: (a) equal access scheme buy-backs; (b) on-market buy-backs; (c) odd
lot buy-backs (now called minimum holding buy-backs); (d) employee share scheme
buy-backs; and (e) selective buy-backs. However, the procedural complexity inher-
ent in the initial buy-back legislation meant that relatively few buy-backs were
undertaken.
Following the recommendations of the Corporations Law Simplification Task-
force, the buy-back provisions were overhauled in 1995 as part of the First Corporate
Law Simplification Act 1995. The amended provisions, which became effective on 9
December 1995, substantially reduced the mandatory requirements for undertaking
share buy-backs.As discussed in Dharmawan and Mitchell (1999), the simplification
process substantially shortened the buy-back provisions and made the procedural
requirements easier and less costly to comply with. Only minor amendments to the
buy-back provisions have occurred since 1995, including a renumbering of the
provisions in 1998.5
ASX Listing Rules
The ASX listing rules have also changed over time, generally following changes in
legislation. The initial set of listing rules relating to share buy-backs was intro-
duced on 31 December 1990. Listing Rule 3V (now superseded) allowed listed
companies to undertake on-market buy-backs after advertising in a national news-
paper and lodging a notice with the ASX. Significant changes to the ASX listing
rules next occurred on 1 July 1996, when new Rules 7.29–7.36 became effective.
The new rules required that notices in standardized format be lodged with the
ASX and no longer required the buy-back to be advertised in a newspaper.6
The standardized notices took the form of ASX Appendices 7B, 7C, 7D and 7E.
The rules also required that for on-market buy-backs, a company’s shares must
have been traded on at least five days in the three months prior to the on-market
buy-back (Listing Rule 7.29.2).
A new set of ASX Appendices (3C/3D/3E/3F) became effective on 1 September
1999 and have been subject to only minor amendments since that time.7 A key
4 The new share buy-back provisions were enacted under Part 3 of the Co-operative Scheme Legislation
Amendment Act 1989, resulting in amendments to the Companies Code.
5 TheCompany Law ReviewAct 1998, which became effective on 1 July 1998, resulted in a re-numbering
of the provisions in theCorporations Law and introduced some small changes.The resulting provisions
became part of a newDivision 2 of Part 2J.1.Minor amendments were also made in 2001 [s257B, s257H
& s257J enacted by No 122 of 2001, s3 (various Schs) (effective 11 March 2002)].
6 For a detailed comparison of the ‘old’ (pre-1995) and ‘new’ (post-1995) rules, see Dharmawan and
Mitchell (1999).
7 A minor change was made to Appendix 3D on 13 March 2000, when the wording in Item 10 was
changed from ‘proposed takeover announcement or offer’ to ‘proposed takeover bid’. Similarly,
on 30 September 2001 the forms were updated to reflect the new Australian Business Number
(ABN) and Corporations Act.A more significant change occurred on 30 September 2001, when items
relating to directors’ participation in the buy-back were deleted (discussed further below).
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feature of the newAppendices is that one form applies to all buy-backs (other than
minimum holding buy-backs, which are exempted from the Appendix-based disclo-
sure system).8 A buy-back is announced using Appendix 3C, any changes to the
original terms of the buy-back are advised in Appendix 3D, daily buy-back
notices are contained in Appendix 3E, and the final buy-back notice is given in
Appendix 3F.
Changes in Disclosure Requirements Over Time
Five key changes in disclosure requirements between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ ASX
Appendix notices can be identified. These are outlined below.
1. Continuous buy-backs: Under the formerAppendix 7B, a company was required
to specify a start and end date for each on-market buy-back.9 Further, the buy-
back was mandated to last for a maximum period of six months. Despite buy-
backs effectively being required to be finalized within six months, some firms
chose to extend their buy-backs beyond the designated period. In effect, this
created ‘extended’ or ‘continuous’ buy-backs, at odds with the six-month limit.10
Under the newAppendix 3C, a company is required only to disclose the intended
duration of the buy-back, and the duration may be unlimited.11
2. Disclosure of directors’ interests: A significant change that occurred on 30 Sep-
tember 2001 was the deletion of items relating to directors’ participation in the
buy-back.This was required in the formerAppendix 7B and the original versions
of Appendix 3C, 3D and 3E.12
3. Exclusion of minimum holding buy-backs: Unlike the former rules, the current
rules exempt minimum holding buy-backs from the disclosure requirements.
8 Previously, certain forms were specific to a particular type of buy-back, such that the announcement
and variation of on-market buy-backs was contained in one dual-purpose form (Appendix 7B), and
a separate final buy-back notice (Appendix 7E) was required for equal access buy-backs. Under the
current system, each form serves a particular purpose and this avoids having a mixture of forms, some
of which relate to only one type of buy-back.The use of ‘generic’ forms for all types of buy-back (other
than minimum holding buy-backs) thus provides for a neater, more streamlined system of disclosure.
9 Appendix 7B, Items 7 and 8.
10 The ability of a company to buy back shares over an extended period of time arises from there being
no deadline given in the Corporations Act for when a buy-back offer must close. However, this does
not mean a company can rely on a single buy-back notice to buy back shares into the future. The
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) considers that a buy-back notice will
become ‘stale’ after 12 months and no longer provide the intended protection for shareholders and
creditors (ASIC Regulatory Guide 110, RG 110.28). After 12 months, a fresh notice will be required
if the company intends to continue buying back shares (ASIC Regulatory Guide 110, RG 110.30). In
a similar vein, where a company has not commenced to buy back shares within two months of the
buy-back notice,ASIC will consider the notice to have expired. In such a case, a new buy-back notice
will be required to be lodged (ASIC Regulatory Guide 110, RG 110.31 & 110.32).
11 Appendix 3C, Item 12.
12 The removal of the requirement to show directors’ participation in the buy-back from 30 September
2001 is reflected in Appendix 3C (Item 10), Appendix 3D (Item 3) and Appendix 3E (Item 6).
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4. Reduction in procedural disclosure requirements: The number of items requiring
disclosure has been reduced and the duplication of information is avoided by
requiring standard information to be reported only once (inAppendix 3C) for all
types of buy-back. Companies are no longer required to disclose inAppendix 3C
the percentage of shares to be bought back, or in Appendix 3F the percentage of
shares in the class that the number bought back represents.
5. Additional disclosure: The newAppendices 3C/3D/3E/3F introduce some minor
additional disclosure items. Appendix 3D requires disclosure of the number of
shares remaining to be bought back and Appendix 3E requires disclosure of the
date thatAppendix 3C was given to theASX.13Also, the compliance statement in
Appendices 3E and 3F has been expanded to include the statement that the
company is in compliance with the CorporationsAct requirements.14 This appears
to place more direct responsibility on the directors.
Impact of Changes in Disclosure Requirements on Firm Compliance
The changes that have occurred to the disclosure requirements raise a number of
issues for further consideration. The following points are pertinent:
• Information requirements: The nature of the information required to be released
is confusing as on the one hand more price sensitive information (maximum and
minimum share price of the buy-back) is required to be disclosed, but on the other
hand there is a reduction in the information required in the initial Appendix 3C,
which is counter-intuitive.
• Directors’ participation: The directors’ intention of participating in the buy-back
is important, as it provides a valuable and associated signalling tool. Similarly, not
reporting directors’ buy-back activity on a timely basis reduces the quality of
information disclosed about insiders participating in the buy-back process.
• ‘Continuous’ buy-backs: The continuous form of buy-back provides less informa-
tion as it moves towards effectively not providing a closure to the buy-back and
diluting the information presented. This approach is similar to the U.S. and U.K.
systems (see Rau andVermaelen, 2002) where the only real information comes in
the form of actual buy-back disclosures released as part of the quarterly reporting
mechanism to the SEC and through the annual accounts (Stephens andWeisbach,
1998; Cook et al., 2003). However, ASIC does not treat the buy-back as strictly
13 Another item that required disclosure underAppendix 3E but not under the formerAppendix 7C was
participation in the buy-back by company directors (discussed earlier). This item required disclosure
under the former initial announcement/change notice (Appendix 7B), but not in the daily notice
(Appendix 7C). However, the disclosure requirement in Appendix 3E was only in place from 1
September 1999 to 30 September 2001, after which it was deleted.
14 The compliance statement in the former Appendices 7C, 7D and 7E contained the single statement
that ‘there is no information that the listing rules require to be disclosed that has not already been
disclosed, or is not contained in, or attached to, this form’. Appendix 7B (equivalent to current
Appendices 3C and 3D) contained the additional clause that the company was also in compliance
with all Corporations Law requirements.
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‘continuous’ since it views buy-backs as becoming stale after 12 months.15 It seems
logical to insert this requirement into theCorporationsAct so that buy-backs have
a natural termination date, say 12 months after the announcement, in conformity
with ASIC guidelines.
• Motivations: Providing a motivation is essential to the assessment of the value of
the buy-back. The extent of adherence to the requirement of providing a motiva-
tion illustrates how seriously companies treat the process and reflects the quality
of information that is provided.
• Relevance of daily buy-back notice: It is relevant to consider what additional
timely information is provided by the daily buy-back notice.This seems a particu-
larly onerous requirement and the information content is low. It is problematic in
a different sense as if not done accurately it has the potential to misinform.16 In
line with the spirit of ASIC Regulatory Guide 110, it would seem more logical to
require comprehensive reporting at regular set intervals (say every three months
or every month) while the buy-back is ongoing.17
• Final buy-back notice: The final buy-back notice (Appendix 3F) is critical in
determining the outcome of the buy-back. If it is omitted the outcome of the
buy-back is largely not communicated. The final buy-back notice plays an impor-
tant role in drawing a line in the sand to indicate that the current buy-back (and
associated information signal) is now closed. Just as the commencement of the
buy-back provides a signal that the company is prepared to stand in the market for
its own shares, the closing of the process provides an additional valuable infor-
mation signal to investors.
• Final buy-back data not put in context: Only four items now require final notice
disclosure for all buy-backs: the type of buy-back, the number of shares bought
back, the total consideration paid or payable, and the high/low share price of
repurchased shares. It would seem sensible to have as a benchmark the number
and the percentage of shares intended to be bought-back relative to what has
already been bought back, together with intended and actual consideration. This
is the critical information that investors want to know throughout the buy-back
process. Many companies voluntarily disclose the percentage of shares bought
back, which indicates it is valuable in judging the progress, as well as the ‘success’,
of the actual buy-back.
• Potential inconsistency of information disclosed: A company must state in its
annual report whether it has an active buy-back (Listing Rule 4.10.18). If it has not
lodged the requisite forms (either initial or final notices) this means that it may fail
to report the situation accurately. Information in the annual report may be mis-
leading, inconsistent with the ASX disclosure or not in accord with actual events.
15 Refer note 10.
16 We elaborate later (with evidence) but inconsistencies can arise where there is no congruence
between the information reported daily and later in Appendix 3F. Mistakes were often noted in the
completion of forms.
17 A monthly report may be more appropriate for buy-backs with an announced duration under six
months.
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• Penalties: The ASX assumes that the regulations are complied with, but an inter-
esting empirical question is whether this is valid assumption. As there are no
specific fines/penalties prescribed for non-compliance, one can only presume that
the general penalties/or delisting via general enforcement provisions for failure to
meet continuous disclosure requirements would apply.18
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Research Questions
Given the importance of the literature on the information content of buy-backs, and
in light of the changes to the disclosure framework noted above, our paper seeks to
address the following questions:
1. What is the extent of compliance with current ASX listing rule requirements?19
2. What information is provided/not provided, and what is the impact for investors?
3. What are the primary motivations stated by managers in ASX releases?
4. What is the actual timeframe of the typical buy-back and how does this compare
to the intended/announced time period?
5. What is the impact of unlimited duration buy-backs in relation to information
disclosure?
Australia provides the only market in the world where such an empirical investi-
gation is possible. It is the only market where there is a rigid framework for disclo-
sure of on-market buy-back information, including buy-back motivations.Analysing
motivations provides information about the signalling mechanism (Mitchell et al.,
2006) as well as the importance that companies place on this activity. To the extent
that motivations vary between companies and across time, they provide valuable
information that should be captured in empirical studies seeking to identify the
information content of share buy-backs.
Data Sources
Our paper uses the rich source of data on Australian share buy-backs that is dis-
closed in ASX share buy-back notices. The details provided in these notices were
manually collected and synthesized into a comprehensive database capturing infor-
mation for all Australian on-market buy-backs made during the period 2000–09.
The data collection procedure involved two stages. First, allASX listed companies
announcing share buy-backs were identified using Morningstar’s DatAnalysis
Imagesignal service. The Imagesignal service, which contains pdf versions of ASX
18 There is some debate on whether introducing penalties encourages more disclosure.While the results
are inconclusive (Blair, 1992), there is limited evidence that increased enforcement activity by ASIC
leads to increased compliance (Welsh, 2009).
19 Of particular interest here are the initial announcement details of intended buy-back amount, time
period, and motivation, and the final announcement details of actual buy-back amount, dollar value,
and share price range.
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announcements, commenced on 1 September 1998. As noted above, given that the
ASX Listing Rules were amended in September 1999 we concentrate on disclosure
and compliance after that date. Hence, buy-back data were sourced for the period 1
January 2000 to 31 December 2009.
In the second stage of the process, the companies identified in stage one were then
analysed individually. This enabled all buy-back related announcements (including
daily buy-back notices) to be viewed in chronological order, assisting identification
of the start and end dates of particular buy-backs.20 Detailed information for all
on-market buy-backs was then collected directly fromASXAppendices 3C, 3D and
3F. Where Appendices were missing, information was compiled (where possible)
from alternative sources including: Appendix 3E forms (daily buy-back notices),
general company filings, annual reports and the capital history note provided in
DatAnalysis. For example,where noASXAppendix 3F formwas on file, information
was collected from the last filed ASXAppendix 3E notice and annual reports were
used to check and confirm the number and cost of shares bought back.
Descriptive Statistics
The number of shares and dollar value of allASX on-market buy-backs have already
been noted in Table 1. Other interesting aspects are apparent from the descriptive
statistics, so we begin by discussing these in more detail before considering the
specific research questions and empirical results.
First, the majority (672 or 83%) of the ASX buy-backs are conducted by Austra-
lian companies and are aimed at repurchasing ordinary shares.A further 59 ordinary
share buy-backs are conducted by foreign companies and there are 76 buy-backs (by
both Australian and foreign companies) of non-ordinary shares. In total, 807 buy-
backs are identified from the Imagesignal database over the period 2000 to 2009.
Second, the domestic buy-backs of ordinary shares (Table 1 Panel A) have differ-
ent overall characteristics to the foreign, or non-Australian, buy-backs of ordinary
shares (Panel B). Further differences exist between the buy-backs of ordinary and
non-ordinary shares (Panel C). The number of shares, both in terms of the number
announced as well as actually bought back, is higher for ordinary share buy-backs
conducted by domestic companies when compared with foreign companies. For
Australian companies, the 9.2 billion shares announced represent on average around
8.0% of shares outstanding with the actual number of shares repurchased of 3.4
billion representing about 3.3% of shares (PanelA).This trend of repurchasing only
around 40% of the number of ordinary shares announced is relatively consistent
throughout the period.
In contrast, foreign companies typically only announce they will repurchase
around 4.7% of ordinary shares. Again the amount eventually repurchased is also
20 In order to obtain as comprehensive a database as possible, care was taken to search announcements
for any information relating to buy-backs. While the majority of buy-back-related announcements
could be found using search terms like ‘buy-back’ (and equivalent alternative expressions) and the
Appendix numbers (e.g., 3C), it was often necessary to view the complete set of a company’s
announcements in chronological order to find announcements that did not include these key terms in
the header.
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correspondingly much lower, at 1.3%. Hence, for foreign company buy-backs the
completion rate of the buy-back is lower at around 28% of the targeted buy-back
amount (Panel B). Foreign company buy-backs thus have less of an overall inten-
tion, less cash commitment to the repurchase and accordingly less signalling.
Evident in Panel C of Table 1, the biggest structural difference across types of
shares bought back is with the repurchase of non-ordinary shares. Here the
announced number of non-ordinary shares as a percentage of share capital is much
greater, at 22.9%. The amount eventually repurchased is 14.1%. Hence, a different
restructuring philosophy for buy-backs of non-ordinary shares is apparent. For
non-ordinary shares, the signalling implications are much lower, and the aim is to
restructure the company by providing an exit strategy (in many cases because of
illiquidity) for these different types of shareholders.
Third,Table 1 provides a good initial insight into the overall level of disclosure and
compliance in the buy-back process. The first column depicts the total number of
buy-backs identified, the second column the sub-set that report the number of shares
intended to be bought back and the third column notes the sub-set that report the
actual number of shares repurchased.As an illustration, for the non-ordinary share
category (Panel C), while 76 buy-backs are identified only 55 provide information
about the number of shares they are intending to repurchase, and only 59 provide
information about the number of shares eventually repurchased.A similar situation
exists across all buy-backs (Panel D). Out of the 807 total buy-backs, only 725
provide information on the intended repurchase amount and 690 report the final
number of shares repurchased. For those buy-backs that do not provide this infor-
mation, an information vacuum occurs and there is a potential issue of lack of
compliance.We now explore this in more detail.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Disclosure and Compliance
In order to evaluate the degree of compliance with the stipulated requirements
and evaluate the type and quality of information, Table 2 identifies the major
items required to be disclosed and the extent to which firms have provided such
disclosure throughout the buy-back process. Table 2 is divided into two sections.
Panel A summarizes the information provided in the initial ASX announcement
notice (Appendix 3C) and Panel B covers the final ASX announcement notice
(Appendix 3F).
For the initial ASX announcement notice, disclosure of the first few items is
procedural with little information content and correspondingly, compliance is high.
The type of buy-back and the class of share both have a 98% compliance rate, and
the items on voting rights and whether the shares are fully/partly paid have a 97%
compliance rate. Compliance for more relevant information—such as the number of
shareholders outstanding (97%), motivation provided (92%), number of shares to
be bought back (89%) and the time period for the buy-back (96%)—are all noted in
Panel A of Table 2. Overall, disclosure of more relevant information as part of the
initial ASX announcement has slightly less compliance, although the compliance
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Table 2
DISCLOSURE PROVIDED FOR ASX BUY-BACKS, PERIOD 2000–09
Panel A: Compliance with disclosure required in announcement notice (Appendix 3C)
Yes No Total % strict (3C)
compliance
% total (3C)
disclosure
Disclosure of type of buy-back (Appendix 3C notice)
Appendix 3C lodged 788 0 788
Other documents 16 3 19
Total 804 3 807 98% 100%
Disclosure of class of share
Appendix 3C lodged 788 0 788
Other documents 13 6 19
Total 801 6 807 98% 99%
Disclosure of voting rights
Appendix 3C lodged 786 2 788
Other documents 0 19 19
Total 786 21 807 97% 97%
Disclosure of fully paid/partly paid shares
Appendix 3C lodged 785 3 788
Other documents 0 19 19
Total 785 22 807 97% 97%
Disclosure of number of shareholders outstanding
Appendix 3C lodged 780 8 788
Other documents 0 19 19
Total 780 27 807 97% 97%
Disclosure of motivation/reason
Appendix 3C lodged 744 44 788
Other documents 4 15 19
Total 748 59 807 92% 93%
Disclosure of number of shares to be bought back
Appendix 3C lodged 719 69 788
Other documents 6 13 19
Total 725 82 807 89% 90%
Disclosure of time period/final buy-back date
Appendix 3C lodged 774 14 788
Other documents 11 8 19
Total 785 22 807 96% 97%
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Table 2
CONTINUED
Panel B: Compliance with disclosure required in final notice (Appendix 3F)
Location of disclosure % strict
(3F)
compliance
% total
(3F)
disclosureApp
3F
Daily
3E
Annual
report
Other
co. ann.
Other
Info.
No
info.
Total
Disclosure of overall completed status and details of buy-back
Complete 416 167 24 5 4 2 618
No initial
notice
9 4 1 14
In-progress 89 89
Indeterminate 86 86
Total 425 171 25 5 4 177 807 53% 78%
Disclosure of type of buy-back (Appendix 3F Notice)
Yes 425 177 43 7 38 690
No 6 111 117
Total 425 177 43 7 44 111 807 53% 86%
Disclosure of final number of shares actually bought back
Yes 425 177 43 7 38 690
No 6 111 117
Total 425 177 43 7 44 111 807 53% 86%
Disclosure of final dollar value of shares actually bought back
Yes 425 177 43 7 38 7 697
No 6 104 110
Total 425 177 43 7 44 111 807 53% 86%
Disclosure of high-low share price for shares actually bought back
Yes 392 392
No 33 177 43 7 44 111 415
Total 425 177 43 7 44 111 807 49% 49%
% strict compliance: The percentage of buy-backs providing the relevant disclosure in the designated
3C/3F ASX notice (strict compliance).
% total disclosure: The percentage of buy-backs providing the relevant disclosure either as part of the
designated notice, or as part of otherASX releases or attachments to releases (e.g.,
annual reports). This includes those firms that are providing the details in the
correct form (‘strict compliance’) as well as those providing the information in
other notices and releases (‘informal disclosure’).
Completed status: The total percentage of companies disclosing the completed status of the buy-back
in a form other than the Appendix 3F notice can be calculated by combining the
relevant sub-totals across the ‘Complete’ category (202) and the ‘No Initial Notice’
category (5). This gives a total of 207 (26%) of the 807 that do not strictly comply
with the required disclosure. Strict compliance with Appendix 3F is measured as
425 out of 807 (53%) and total disclosure is 632 (618 plus 14) out of 807 (78%).
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rate is still reasonable (around 90% or greater). These reported numbers reflect a
‘strict compliance’ with ASX requirements, namely reporting the information spe-
cifically in the initial announcement notice (Appendix 3C).This is contrasted with a
situation where the information is buried elsewhere in other ASX disclosures. Strict
compliance is the appropriate form of compliance, as the information should be
provided correctly and completely in the mandated form rather than requiring
investors to incur search costs and inconvenience trying to locate the information in
other information releases. Table 2 also notes the additional informal or ‘total dis-
closure’ compliance rate, which captures whether the information can be sourced
regardless of whether it is in the correct form. While possible for researchers, this
procedure would be impractical for most investors. The total disclosure compliance
rate is slightly higher for the initial announcement ASX Appendix 3C notice
(Table 2 Panel A).
Non-compliance with the required disclosure in the final ASX notice (Appendix
3F) is stark and of concern (Table 2 Panel B). Considering the (four) key individual
items, strict compliance in each case is: 53% for the type of buy-back, the number of
shares bought back, and the final dollar value actually bought back, and 49% for the
price range (high-low) of the actual repurchases. Once again, information is dis-
closed outside of the mandated form in other ASX releases such as Appendix 3E
daily buy-back notices, annual reports, notices of meetings and other ASX
announcements.As a result, it is extremely time consuming to find key information.
With approximately 33% of buy-backs providing an alternative means of disclosure,
it is difficult to envisage how investors can get a complete, straightforward or sen-
sible picture regarding whether a buy-back is finished or what has occurred during
the buy-back process.
Using all disclosure releases, we sought to investigate whether one could obtain
confirmation as to whether a buy-back was completed, or if not completed,
whether the status of the buy-back was clear as at the end of 2009. Here, buy-
backs were classified into four categories: ‘complete’, ‘no initial notice’, ‘in-
progress’ and ‘indeterminate’. ‘Complete’ is where the buy-back can be classified
as finished, even though the company may not have provided some of the infor-
mation. ‘No initial notice’ is where it is possible to treat the buy-back as com-
pleted, but the targeted finish date or time period for the buy-back was not
provided properly as part of the initial disclosure (ASX Appendix 3C notice), and
so it was not clear when the buy-back would end. ‘In-progress’ refers mainly to
recent 2009 (or unlimited) buy-backs that were still ongoing and had not reached
their targeted finish date. ‘Indeterminate’ is where the buy-back is not able to be
classified as ‘complete’ or ‘in-progress’ using the information provided in ASX
releases.
For 425 (53%) of the 807 buy-backs the market is able to discern that the buy-back
is finalized through the correct formal Appendix 3F notice (Table 2 Panel B). A
further 207 (26%) buy-backs provide the closure information in other ASX
announcements or locations. However, it is not possible to determine whether 86
(11%) of buy-backs have been finalized. These buy-backs are not concluded using
the requisite Appendix 3F notice, nor is information provided in any alternative
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manner that enables the status of the buy-back to be readily ascertained. For
fourteen completed buy-backs, no initial Appendix 3C notice is provided. Overall
then, an alternative form of disclosure of buy-back completion is provided for 202
(618 - 416) (25%) properly announced buy-backs, while no proper notification of
either the initial announcement or the completion of the buy-back is provided in 100
(86 + 14) (12%) cases.
Of the 718 buy-backs that are not ‘in progress’, only 58% comply strictly with
ASX disclosure requirements. In 29% of cases, disclosure is provided in some
other form, making it possible (with effort) to piece together relevant information
about the progress of the buy-back. However, in 12% of cases, companies fail to
provide sufficient information about the buy-back. We stress that this last analysis
concentrates simply on confirming whether the buy-back is complete, and not on
the quality of any of the information released during the buy-back process, as
already commented on for the specific items above. In terms of the 632 buy-
backs we were able to identify as complete, a significant number of buy-backs
(216 or 30%) did not fully comply with one of the ASX’s strict disclosure
requirements.
Motivations Provided
A cataloguing of the main buy-back motivations and whether they have altered over
the sample period is presented in Table 3. A key showing the way the various
motivations are coded is provided in the Appendix, which follows and extends the
original coding in Mitchell and Robinson (1999).As can be seen fromTable 3, there
is an emphasis on M3 capital structure management as a primary motivation (Panel
A),whereasM4 undervaluation andM7 financial position are provided as secondary
motivations (Panel B). Little variation in the motivations occurs over our sample
period 2000–09. Consistent with Table 2, in about 7% of cases, no motivation is
provided, although in turn, there are on average 1.25 motivations provided for each
buy-back.
In order to compare the current sample’s motivation disclosures with disclosures
prior to the listing rule changes in December 1999, motivations for buy-backs
conducted over the period 1996 to 1999 were sourced as a benchmark. The bench-
mark motivations were obtained from the database of motivations used in
Mitchell et al. (2001) and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007). Mirroring Panels A and
B of Table 3, the results for the period 1996 to 1999 are presented in Panels C
and D.
Generally, the recent motivations are consistent with previous disclosures,
although for the current sample period there is a variation in the importance hier-
archy. Relative to the pre-2000 period there is now more of a focus on M3 capital
structure (60%) and a reduced focus on M4 undervaluation (10%) as the prime
motivations (Panel A). Previously, M4 (the undervaluation motivation) was used in
25% of instances, and M3 was used in only 21% of cases as the prime motivation
(Panel C).The current reduction in reporting of the undervaluation motivation (M4)
is consistent with the implications of previous literature—namely that the informa-
tion content of providing this motivation in the buy-back is relevant, so it is now used
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Table 3
MOTIVATIONS OF BUY-BACKS NOTED IN ASX ANNOUNCEMENTS
Panel A: Motivations disclosed as priority (first motivation), period 2000–09
Year M1 M2 M3 M3b M4 M5 M6 M7 M10 M11 M11b M12 M14 Total
2000 1 17 1 4 2 1 1 2 29
2001 2 35 10 17 3 2 5 74
2002 5 37 11 7 1 1 4 66
2003 2 30 8 10 1 3 4 58
2004 4 33 7 5 1 3 1 8 62
2005 5 49 10 4 2 5 4 9 88
2006 4 47 9 5 3 3 2 8 81
2007 6 50 7 10 2 4 1 4 84
2008 5 116 12 12 1 3 3 2 3 8 165
2009 3 71 5 6 1 4 3 7 100
Total 0 37 485 80 80 6 1 22 3 22 3 9 59 807
0% 5% 60% 10% 10% 1% 0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 1% 7% 100%
Panel B: All motivations disclosed regardless of priority (any order), period 2000–09
Year M1 M2 M3 M3b M4 M5 M6 M7 M10 M11 M11b M12 M14 Total
2000 1 1 19 2 6 3 2 1 2 37
2001 5 38 10 19 1 10 3 1 5 92
2002 9 37 15 10 4 5 1 1 1 4 87
2003 6 31 13 13 1 4 4 4 76
2004 8 35 8 6 3 5 4 1 8 78
2005 10 49 11 9 2 10 4 9 104
2006 6 49 14 5 5 5 1 2 8 95
2007 11 53 9 15 6 5 1 2 1 4 107
2008 16 120 13 32 4 9 7 5 2 4 8 220
2009 5 72 6 7 1 3 2 7 1 3 7 114
Total 1 77 503 101 122 21 1 59 10 35 9 12 59 1,010
0% 8% 50% 10% 12% 2% 0% 6% 1% 3% 1% 1% 6% 100%
Panel C: Motivations disclosed as priority (first motivation), period 1996–99
Year M1 M2 M3 M3b M4 M5 M7 M8 M11 M12 M13 M14 Total
1996 4 3 1 17 3 2 5 5 40
1997 7 14 3 14 1 2 1 7 1 9 59
1998 6 23 7 19 1 12 3 3 1 2 18 95
1999 11 18 6 19 1 6 1 4 16 82
Total 0 28 58 17 69 6 22 10 14 1 3 48 276
0% 10% 21% 6% 25% 2% 8% 4% 5% 0% 1% 17% 100%
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more sparingly. For the recent 2000 to 2009 period there are now distinctly fewer
firms that do not provide a motivation—that is, 7% (PanelA) relative to 17% for the
period 1996 to 1999 (Panel C).Again this supports the merit of providing a motiva-
tion as part of the signalling mechanism.
Time Period and Unlimited Duration Buy-Backs
We now consider the duration of the buy-backs by comparing the actual buy-back
time period to the announced, or intended, time period. This also allows us to
evaluate ‘unlimited’ or ‘continuous’ buy-backs relative to defined period buy-backs.
Table 4 provides the relevant statistics on the actual period taken for the buy-back
using different groupings of the announcement timeframe. The total results (Panel
A) are decomposed by whether the buy-back is conducted by a foreign or a domestic
company (Panels B and C) and whether the original time frame is extended or not
(Panels D and E).
The results (Panel A) reveal that the ratio of the actual to the announced time
period is reasonably close (0.9 on average). The most common timeframe, both in
terms of announcement as well as the actual period for completion, is around
nine to twelve months. This preferred timeframe of less than 12 months is in part
dictated by the additional Corporations Act requirement that mandates share-
holder approval for buy-backs seeking to repurchase greater than 10% of shares
over a 12-month period. This requirement exists regardless of the timeframe or
whether the buy-back is stated to be an unlimited buy-back. As such, Panel A
Table 3
CONTINUED
Panel D: All motivations disclosed regardless of priority (any order), period 1996–99
Year M1 M2 M3 M3b M4 M5 M7 M8 M11 M12 M13 M14 Total
1996 1 6 5 1 18 3 4 5 3 6 52
1997 1 8 15 3 19 3 8 1 10 1 9 78
1998 8 26 7 22 3 21 4 15 3 2 24 135
1999 15 26 6 19 3 13 1 8 2 20 113
Total 2 37 72 17 78 12 46 11 36 5 3 59 378
1% 10% 19% 4% 21% 3% 12% 3% 10% 1% 1% 16% 100%
Details of the various motivations (coded M1 to M14) are contained in the Appendix.
Motivations not noted in the table were not disclosed in the relevant period.
The coding follows the original work and coding mechanism of Mitchell and Robinson (1999) and later papers. Two
additions are made to reflect new motivations that have appeared to become relevant in more recent announcement
periods and which merit separate coding:M3b,which captures the restructuring mechanism of the number of shares (i.e.,
trying to maintain balance in number of shares or offset effects of dilution) and M11b, which captures attempts to create
stability of the share price or alleviate price volatility.As these items are variants of the original M3 andM11motivations,
they are coded as M3b and M11b respectively.
M14 denotes unavailable as well as no sensible motivation being provided. The most obvious example of the latter is
where the motivation for the buy-back is stated as ‘for the benefit of shareholders’ which sheds no light on a practical,
useful motivation for the specific instance. Given that a firm would not state it was taking an action that was not in
shareholders’ interests, such motivations are superfluous and add no value.
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Table 4
LENGTH OF ASX BUY-BACKS:ANNOUNCED RELATIVE TO ACTUAL PERIOD, 2000–09
Panel A: All buy-backs on ASX regardless of extension
Announced
period
No. of
buy-backs
in period
(count)
Average
announced
period
(months)
Average
actual
period (months)
Ratio of actual
to announced
period
Completion
date
provided
0 to 3 months 63 1.4 1.6 1.1 57
3 to 6 months 76 5.7 7.3 1.3 62
6 to 9 months 28 7.2 9.5 1.3 27
9 to 12 months 472 11.9 9.9 0.8 352
>12 months 24 15.5 12.5 0.8 15
Unlimited 122 11.7 105
No disclosure 22 4.3 14
Total 807 10.1 9.1 0.9 632
Panel B: ASX buy-backs Australian companies
Announced
period
No. of
buy-backs
in period
(count)
Average
announced
period
(months)
Average
actual
period (months)
Ratio of actual
to announced
period
Completion
date
provided
0 to 3 months 46 1.5 1.7 1.1 44
3 to 6 months 71 5.7 7.4 1.3 57
6 to 9 months 25 7.2 8.3 1.2 24
9 to 12 months 444 11.9 9.9 0.8 326
>12 months 22 14.7 8.8 0.6 13
Unlimited 117 11.9 101
No disclosure 13 4.5 9
Total 738 10.3 9.2 0.9 574
Panel C: ASX buy-backs foreign companies
Announced
period
No. of
buy-backs
in period
(count)
Average
announced
period
(months)
Average actual
period (months)
Ratio of actual
to announced
period
Completion
date
provided
0 to 3 months 17 1.3 1.5 1.2 13
3 to 6 months 5 5.8 6.4 1.1 5
6 to 9 months 3 7.8 18.5 2.4 3
9 to 12 months 28 11.8 10.3 0.9 26
>12 months 2 24.0 36.1 1.5 2
Unlimited 5 6.7 4
No disclosure 9 3.8 5
Total 69 8.2 8.5 1.0 58
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illustrates that ‘unlimited’ buy-backs are in practice not unlimited but constrained
by this 10% of share capital rule. Interestingly, the effective length of 11.7 months
for ‘unlimited’ buy-backs is actually less than the average actual period of 12.5
months for the ‘longer than 12 month’ announcement timeframe category.
Domestic companies (Table 4 Panel B) tend to use unlimited buy-backs more
frequently than foreign companies (Panel C). Further, foreign company buy-backs
have both a shorter announcement (8.2 months) and actual time period (8.5 months)
for completion of the buy-back relative toAustralian companies (10.3months and 9.2
months respectively) as noted in Panels B and C.No real difference is evident in the
length of buy-backs of non-ordinary, relative to ordinary, shares (not reported in
tables).
Table 4
CONTINUED
Panel D: ASX buy-backs without extension
Announced
period
No. of
buy-backs
in period
(count)
Average
announced
period
(months)
Average actual
period (months)
Ratio of actual
to announced
period
Completion
date
provided
0 to 3 months 56 1.4 1.3 0.9 50
3 to 6 months 61 5.8 5.1 0.9 49
6 to 9 months 21 7.3 6.5 0.9 21
9 to 12 months 426 11.9 9.2 0.8 323
>12 months 22 15.7 12.5 0.8 14
Unlimited 115 11.0 99
No disclosure 22 4.3 14
Total 723 10.2 8.3 0.8 570
Panel E: ASX buy-backs with extension
Announced
period
No. of
buy-backs
in period
(count)
Average
announced
period
(months)
Average actual
period (months)
Ratio of actual
to announced
period
Completion
date
provided
0 to 3 months 7 1.9 3.9 2.1 7
3 to 6 months 15 5.4 15.4 2.9 13
6 to 9 months 7 7.1 19.7 2.8 6
9 to 12 months 46 11.9 17.9 1.5 29
>12 months 2 13.5 12.6 0.9 1
Unlimited 7 23.5 6
No disclosure 0 0
Total 84 9.3 16.4 1.8 62
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Generally, buy-backs are completed within the allotted or announced time, as
captured by the average ratio of the actual period to the announced period
(Table 4 Panel A). For some announcement categories these ratios are greater
than 1 due to the company applying for an extension as required. Once the results
are broken down into buy-backs with no extension (Table 4 Panel D) relative to
those with extension (Panel E), the ratios for the not extended buy-backs are
all below 1, confirming that the majority of buy-backs are completed before
the targeted finish date. For buy-backs that were extended, the final completion
date is naturally after the originally supplied finish date. In such cases, the share-
holder is kept informed via the extension process (ASX Appendix 3D notice).
In virtually all cases where the buy-back has a defined time period and the original
finish date was provided as part of the Appendix 3C initial announcement,
the actual length of the buy-back complies with the requirements. Where no dis-
closure of the finish date is provided in the initial buy-back announcement, the
buy-back is still actually finished within a reasonable timeframe (4.3 months);
hence there is no delay associated with the buy-back due to the non-disclosure
(Table 4 Panel A).
An important concern is whether unlimited duration buy-backs are used as a
means to obfuscate disclosure and compliance given that, as noted in Table 4, they
already mask the timeframe of the buy-back. The disclosure and compliance
notices for both the initial announcement and the final buy-back (as provided in
Table 2) are examined separately for unlimited buy-backs (not reported in tables)
and reveal this is, in fact, the situation. For the unlimited buy-back category the
initial ASX notice disclosure is good, with around 96%–99% compliance for the
various items (slightly superior to the compliance results for the full sample). The
one exception here is the disclosure of the number of shares to be bought back,
which is provided only in 87% of cases. Naturally the disclosure of the period of
the buy-back is redundant for the unlimited category. However, the compliance
with the final ASX notice disclosure requirements is very poor, with only around
42% of the unlimited buy-backs providing the appropriate disclosure in the proper
Appendix 3F form (strict compliance). As a result, the unlimited type of buy-back,
in addition to encouraging uncertainty with respect to duration, is generally asso-
ciated with signals of low quality and non-compliance with required disclosure
items concerning the final status of the buy-back. It seems counterproductive to
allow for such unlimited buy-backs given the aim of the ASX’s framework to
provide clear signals and timely information disclosure as part of the buy-back
process.
ANECDOTAL ISSUES AND SUGGESTED REGULATORY REFORM
Our examination of buy-back compliance and disclosure reveals a number of issues
that merit further consideration. In particular, there are several aspects of the
buy-back process that are not well addressed by the existingASX Listing Rules and
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procedures. These items are noted below, together with some suggestions for regu-
latory reform.
1. Compliance: Lack of compliance in providing the initial form Appendix 3C and
the final formAppendix 3F as well as all relevant details therein is of concern. It
is not practical for investors to have to search alternativeASX announcements so
that they can reach a conclusion as to whether the buy-back is complete, or to
determine the number of shares bought back. Our recommendation is first,
for the ASX to impose specific fines for non-compliance (for either not submit-
ting the requisite form or not providing adequate details) and second, to enforce
the compliance via a process of review to prohibit the buy-back from proceeding
or others taking place in future (i.e., banned list) if relevant details are not
provided.
2. Foreign companies: It is not clear if, and when, foreign company buy-backs
should comply with theASX buy-back listing rule requirements. For instance, if a
buy-back is initiated overseas to what extent does the foreign company need to
comply with ASX requirements? Another aspect is that if shares are only pur-
chased on an overseas exchange, does the company need to go through the same
procedure for reporting on theASX?At present it is not clear what the required
disclosure is for these foreign buy-backs, with different levels of detail actually
being provided.21
The recommended approach is to have a slightly different ASX Appendix
notice for overseas buy-backs. If the company intends to buy shares back on the
ASX then it needs to provide the relevant announcement forms and disclosure
details, as it would for an ASX buy-back. Similarly, if any shares are actually
purchased on the ASX as part of an overseas buy-back then the full ASX final
notice requirements need to be complied with. If the shares are only repurchased
overseas, the relevant details of the impact on share capital should still be pro-
vided to the ASX, notwithstanding the overseas buy-back filing/repurchase. The
aim is to ensure that ASX investors are fully informed regarding all repurchases
and their impact on share capital, regardless of which exchange the repurchase
takes place on.
3. Multiple buy-backs: Different buy-back types occurring at the same time are
very confusing to investors and provide mixed signals. On-market buy-backs
combined with either equal access or selective buy-backs are the most
problematic. In some cases it is not clear to which buy-back the ASX disclosure
relates. Ideally the company would need to divorce the restructuring activity
21 If a company is listed on two different exchanges (e.g., the ASX and LSE) then a buy-back is
feasible on either or both exchanges, with different local requirements for the buy-back
procedure and disclosure mechanism. If an overseas buy-back is initiated, then domestic
shareholders still need to be informed of it and have disclosure of the impact and outcome.
Separately noting the extent to which the buy-back is intended to occur/has occurred on
an overseas exchange through a more detailed, separate section of the ASX Appendix 3C/3F forms,
is seen as a practical way of communicating this information to investors and the market.
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done mainly through equal access and selective buy-backs from signalling
done through an on-market buy-back. Hence, the recommendation is that
on-market buy-backs should only be allowed where there is no other buy-back
in place.
4. Unlimited/continuous buy-backs: Buy-backs of unlimited duration differ in
nature from buy-backs undertaken for a definite period since the information
conveyed is not synonymous. As the prime motivation of a buy-back is to
commit capital during periods of undervaluation and provide informa-
tion signalling, the continuous form of buy-back does not achieve that objective.
Hence, the recommendation is to eliminate the continuous buy-back
option and make the maximum period 12 months.22 The ASX Appendix
3F final buy-back notice should be submitted when the buy-back is
complete, at the designated completion date or at the end of the 12 month
period, whichever is earlier. This should be supplemented with (at least) quar-
terly or (potentially) monthly reporting of the relevant information about buy-
back activity so that investors are fully informed throughout the buy-back
process.
5. Information overload: The daily share buy-back information provided in ASX
Appendix 3E is too frequent and unhelpful, as the information does not
provide any meaningful insight into the buy-back. It would be more
efficient to provide a quarterly or monthly summary containing the original
announcement details (restated for clarity), the number of shares currently
bought back, the maximum/minimum and average prices paid for the
shares bought back, as well as the intention to continue or terminate the
buy-back.
6. Incorrect/inconsistent reporting: Errors were frequently noted in daily share
buy-back notices (Appendix 3E). These included firms not completing the form
correctly, failing to show consistent information for shares bought back on the
previous day, and reporting incorrect cumulative tallies. Typically this is a
problem for companies ‘extending’ a buy-back beyond 12 months and then
re-setting the count at a particular point in time.
Overall, only one buy-back type should be permitted at any time. In terms of
the timing or duration of the buy-back, our view is that it should be for a
maximum period of 12 months. This is in keeping with the Corporations Act’s
10/12 rule, support from ASIC Regulatory Guide 110, as well as the results above
documenting the practical length of actual conducted buy-backs. Lamba and
Ramsay (2005) raise concerns about companies announcing more than one share
buy-back in close proximity to one another. They also point out the difficulties that
22 This is in line with the view of ASIC as stated inASIC Regulatory Guide 110.Another approach is to
have a six-month limit with an option of extending that for a further six months. A summary/
termination form or intention to extend with relevant details should then be provided at the six-
month point.
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arise when the original buy-back is not formally closed and when information is
not properly communicated about the buy-back status.23 We have a similar view
and note that a clear understanding of the length and details of the buy-back
should be provided as part of the initial announcement. Summary reports
should then be provided on a periodic basis indicating the current status
of the buy-back and whether there is any intention to extend the buy-back.
The final notice must be given, at the latest, 12 months after the announce-
ment date of the buy-back. Failure to conform to these requirements should
attract an appropriate penalty, and emphasis should be placed on overcoming
incorrect practices when completing the details required on the buy-back
forms.
The above recommendations will result in the following time-line:
Start: ASX Appendix 3C Announcement notice—first communication
of buy-back with relevant details (as currently provided) and with a
maximum duration of 12 months (recommendation points 1, 2 and 4
above).
During: ASX Appendix 3E Quarterly/monthly statements (replacing current
daily notices)—with relevant details (recommendation point 5
above).
Variation: ASXAppendix 3DOn-market variation notice—if buy-back details are
changed.
End: ASX Appendix 3F Final notice—with relevant details: number of and
dollar value of shares repurchased, high and low price (as currently
provided), plus the number of shares remaining relative to that
announced and average share price paid for repurchase (recommenda-
tion points 3 and 6 above).
CONCLUSION
Overall our results show that the degree of firm compliance with disclosure require-
ments is generally reasonable (around 89%–98%) for the initial ASX on-market
buy-back announcement notice. Disclosure of the number of shares to be bought
back, which can be seen as the most sensitive and relevant piece of information, has
23 Lamba and Ramsay’s (2005) comments applied to the period under the old ASX Listing Rule
framework that required buy-backs to be a maximum of six months duration but could then be
extended. Companies that did not complete a buy-back within the (old) six-month limit often
announced a follow-up buy-back. However, from the announcement information it is not always
possible to ascertain whether the announced buy-back is a new buy-back or an extension
of a previously announced buy-back. Lamba and Ramsay split their sample to consider
companies announcing a subsequent buy-back within six months from those that do not. A positive
market reaction to companies announcing multiple buy-backs was found, suggesting
they are not mere extensions of previous buy-backs, and accordingly should not be referred
to as such.
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the worst compliance (89%) of all mandated disclosure items for the initial buy-back
announcement. Compliance with the regulated disclosure for the final ASX buy-
back notification is much worse,with a compliance rate ranging around 49%–53% in
terms of strict compliance. In terms of informal disclosure, where the relevant
Appendix 3F buy-back information is communicated through means other than the
requisite form (requiring investors to search through various sources to identify and
piece together relevant information), compliance is higher, around 86% for most
items. One exception here is that compliance is still only around 49% for the
disclosure of the high-low share price paid during the buy-back process.
Further, lack of clarity about the completion status of the buy-back process is an
issue. It was difficult to ascertain the status of many buy-backs that do not even
provide a clear statement as to whether they have been, or when they are likely to
be, completed.
Several recommendations are made in an attempt to improve the buy-back
process. Firstly, ‘unlimited period’ buy-backs should not be permitted. Unlimited
duration buy-backs are not practical and defeat the purpose of having
a buy-back announcement mechanism. Unlimited buy-backs are not recom-
mended by ASIC and our results show that they have low compliance with
other relevant disclosure requirements. For unlimited buy-backs, formal
compliance of required information as part of the final ASX buy-back notice was
only around 42%, lower than that for buy-backs with a defined period. Our view
is that it much harder for shareholders to identify whether unlimited buy-backs
are complete, or what the final buy-back details are. Accordingly, we recommend
that buy-backs be permitted to last for a maximum period of 12 months, with
periodic reports being lodged quarterly or monthly. At the end of 12 months, a
buy-back must be finalized. If a company wishes to continue to buy back shares, it
must begin a new buy-back, lodging Appendix 3C and proceeding in the usual
manner.
Secondly, while the basic mechanism of reporting using four forms (Appendices
3C, 3D, 3E and 3F) should be maintained, we suggest the following modifications.
The announcement of the buy-back (Appendix 3C) should include the duration of
the buy-back (start and end dates), which should not exceed 12 months. The
requirement to lodge daily share buy-back notices (Appendix 3E) should be
replaced with a requirement to report only at quarterly/monthly intervals, over-
coming the problem of information overload. Importantly, the ability for compa-
nies to extend buy-backs beyond a 12-month period should be removed. This will
help to overcome deficiencies in the practices of some firms failing to lodge a final
buy-back notice on the grounds that a buy-back is ‘continual’. The final buy-back
notice (Appendix 3F) is highly important as it brings closure to the buy-back and
reports the buy-back results. A final buy-back notice should be mandatory and
required even if firms choose to report the buy-back results in other ASX infor-
mation releases.
In addition to these recommendations about the buy-back process, there are two
other important points that arise from our analysis. First, contemporaneous
buy-backs should not be permitted as they have the potential to confuse investors
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and may create mixed signals. Second, there needs to be a clearer set of
procedures for foreign buy-backs ensuring adequate disclosure is made about the
intention and details for the portion of the buy-back that relates to ASX-listed
shares.
The current ASX buy-back disclosure rules aim to provide a clear approach to
communicating all aspects of the on-market buy-back process. Unfortunately, this
aim is not being achieved at present, with confusion arising from the lack of
required disclosure, compliance with, and enforcement of, the buy-back regula-
tions. Given the disclosure and compliance deficiencies we have documented in
this paper, the recommendations noted above will encourage a more transparent
and efficient buy-back process so that investors are more fully informed at all
stages of the buy-back process, thus ensuring that the maximum signalling effect
occurs.
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APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION KEY FOR MOTIVATIONS
Code Title Description
Excess liquidity (surplus cash effect)
M1 Dividends v. capital gains
(personal tax saving)
Alternative to paying dividends is to distribute cash to
shareholders as a capital gain. Personal tax consideration of
buy-backs vs dividends is a factor.
M2 Return of surplus capital Company has surplus liquid funds that it decides to return to
shareholders.
Capital structure (leverage effect)
M3 Gearing (corporate
restructuring)
Reduces the equity of the firm, hence changing the capital
structure mix.
M3b Gearing (number of shares) To maintain balance in the number of shares issued, offset
dilution through increase in number of shares.
Information signalling (leverage effect)
M4 Signal future expectations
(underpricing)
Signal management’s perception of the ‘true’ (intrinsic) value
of the firm (underpricing by market).
M5 Limited investment (less
speculative) opportunities
Management believe the firm is the best investment that can
be made with the surplus cash. Note must have limited
investment opportunities in addition to surplus capital (as for
M2).
M6 Limited growth opportunities Engage in buy-backs due to lack of growth options. Note
growth options are internal relative to external investment
opportunities (M5).
M7 Declining (improve) financial
performance and position
Share buy-backs are contended to have a positive effect on
EPS or NABS.
Wealth transfers (expropriation effect)
M8 Remove a shareholder Removal of shareholders who are critical of management,
pay a premium above market to favoured shareholders, or
keep a large sale off-market. Increases the percentage
holding (ownership) of remaining shareholders.
M9 Defend against a potential
takeover offer
Takeover defence mechanism provided by repurchases, that
is, increase substantial shareholding of non-participants.
Miscellaneous motivations (other effects)
M10 Economic activity Firms will only take advantage of buy-backs when economic
conditions are relatively poor.
M11 Illiquid (non-existent) market Expedite the sale of those shareholders who wish to sell their
shares but no market is available or it is illiquid.
M11b Stability of share price Intervene in market to provide stability for the share price.
M12 Administrative burden on
registry
Repurchase is an effort to consolidate share registry for
administrative (i.e., rationalize cost) reasons.
M13 Removal of subsidiary’s
shareholding in parent
As part of (or post) a takeover, a subsidiary’s interest in the
parent must be removed within 12 months (Corporations
Law, s.185).
Unavailable
M14 Unavailable—no reason given Announcements failed to give a reason for buy-back.
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